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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
All interested parties are identified in the caption on appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utal i Code i \t n lotated 7gA_3_io2 (3). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Court granted certiorari on the following issues: 
Issue No. 1: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding there was 
insufficient evidence to support an apportionment-to-pre-existing-conditions jury 
instruction. 
Preset \ ation: This issue was presented in im :^-:uon for certiorari at 
5 and 12-14, and in the brief in opposition to the petition at 7-8. 
Standard of Review: On a writ of certiorari, this Court reviews the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness. Peterson v. Kennard, 2008 UT 
90, T| 8, 201 P.3d 956. A trial court's jury instructions are reviewed for correctness 
and will be uj > i "when the instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the 
jury on uu applicable to the case." Clayton v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 UT App 
154, [^8; 214 P. 3d 865. 
Issue No 2: Whether the court of appeals erred iti holding the 
apportionment instruction required evidence of a symptomatic pre-existing 
condition on the "date of the accident." 
Presei \ atioi I: This issue was presented in tl le petitioi I for certiorari at 
5 and 14-16. 
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Standard of Review: On a writ of certiorari, this Court reviews the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness. Peterson v. Kennard, 2008 UT 
90,p ,201P.3d956. 
Issue No. 3: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding the 
apportionment instruction affected the outcome of the trial. 
Preservation: This issue was presented in the petition for certiorari at 
5 and 16-18, and in the brief in opposition to the petition at 13-15. 
Standard of Review: On a writ of certiorari, this Court reviews the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness. Peterson v. Kennard, 2008 UT 
90, \ 8; 201 P.3d 956. A trial court's judgment will be upheld unless uthere is a 
reasonable likelihood that absent the error, there would have been a result more 
favorable to the complaining party." Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 
109?1|16; 992 P. 2d 969. 
Issue No. 4. In addition to the three granted issues, the Court requested the 
parties to address the question of whether Biswell v. Duncan, 743 P. 2d 80 (UT 
App. 1987) states the correct legal standard. 
OPINION BELOW 
The Court of Appeals decision below is Wendy Harris v. ShopKo Stores, 
Inc., 2011 UT App 329; WL4485973. A copy is appended in the addendum. 
6 
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CONTROLLING CONSTITUTION, STATUTE, OR REGULATION 
There is no controlling constitutional provision, statute or regulation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and disposition below 
Plaintiff Wendy Harris sued Defendant ShopKo Stores for personal injury 
sustained when she sat on a sample office chair which fell apart, causing her to fall 
to the floor. Plaintiff sued alleging negligence, and seeking past medical expenses 
of $33,203.34, future medical expenses of $39,574, and noneconomic damages 
(Opinion below, Tffll, 11). 
The case was tried to a jury in the Fourth District before the Honorable 
Christine S. Johnson. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded $15,000 in 
past medical expenses, $10,000 in future medical expenses, and $1,000 in 
noneconomic damages (Opinion below, ^Jll). Plaintiff moved for a new trial or 
additur of $130,000 and the trial court denied the motion (Opinion below, [^12; R. 
922,1139). 
During the trial, Plaintiff objected to the trial court giving a jury instruction 
on apportionment to pre-existing-conditions based on CV2018. The form of the 
instruction was not at issue, but Plaintiff objected that no trial evidence supported a 
finding she was suffering from any pre-existing condition at the time of the 
accident. The trial court denied the objection, finding "ShopKo presented 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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substantial evidence that Harris' injuries could be attributed to alternative sources 
(other than the ShopKo incident), both through cross examination of (Harris's) 
witnesses, and through affirmative testimony from its own witnesses. Harris had a 
history of neck and back pain, her medical records included references to 
fibromyalgia, and testimony also included the opinion that her current condition 
was not trauma related, but caused by degenerative disk disease. In short, 
testimony was conflicted with regard to the cause of Harris's condition" (Opinion 
below, [^19 citing the trial court's Memorandum Decision). A copy of the trial 
court's Memorandum Decision is appended in the addendum. 
Plaintiff raised eleven issues on appeal. The court of appeals reversed and 
remanded for a new trial after addressing only one issue, the apportionment-to-pre-
existing-conditions jury instruction. The court of appeals found that giving that 
instruction was reversible error, concluding the jury might have awarded more 
damages if the instruction had not been given (Opinion below, ]fl3, 25). 
FACTS 
The trial record contains evidence and testimony indicating that Ms. Harris 
suffered from pre-existing lower back problems which elicit the same types of pain 
and symptoms Ms. Harris is claiming as part of her damages, pre-existing back 
problems which continue to worsen over time. Dr. Colledge testified that it was 
"probable that the disc degeneration [he] observed with Ms. Harris is a cause of her 
8 
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present complaints" (Tr. 641:17-20); that an MRI taken a year after the accident 
showed degenerative changes (Tr. 612: 13-15); the minor disc bulge is "part of the 
degenerative cascade or disease" (Tr. 608: 20-22); Ms. Harris' complaint of low 
back pain was a component of degenerative disc disease; facet disease; and an 
aggravation of those (Tr. 583: 14-21). Kay Whittaker referred Ms. Harris to a 
neurologist in 2006, who noted that she had "some early degenerative changes 
consistent with her age" (Tr. 545:1-4, 14-16). 
Dr. Colledge testified that Ms. Harris' history of possible sciatica in 2002 
(Tr. Tr. 386:11-15) could "play a role in some of the lower back issues she was 
having and complaining of at the time" (Tr. 588: 10-14). In 2002, Dr. Scuderi 
testified that he treated Ms. Harris for sciatica (TR: 392:9-12), including radiating 
left leg pain; Dr. Scuderi treated her for the same symptoms after the ShopKo 
accident (TR 392:25-393:1); Dr. Scuderi admitted that "it would appear" that Ms. 
Harris had a pre-existing history of neck and back pain, according to the medical 
records presented at trial (Tr. 387:1:5), including a July 2002, visit to Alta View 
Hospital for "excruciating discomfort in the lumbar area and a diagnosis of left leg 
pain and questionable sciatica" (Tr. 386:11-15). 
Dr. Rosenthal testified that the pain from Ms. Harris' facet syndrome had 
resolved, but she is still suffering from coccydynia (Tr. 231:20-24), which is a 
separate pain generator; coccydynia is caused by overuse (Tr. 231:25-232:6). 
9 
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Harris also has a preexisting history of fibromyalgia (Tr. 572:15-19, 531:17-
24), which can manifest itself in the form of lower back pain (Tr. 573:9-14). 
Dr. Rosenthal, Harris' expert, testified that Harris had overused dilaudid 
pain pills (Tr. 253:15-22 - used prescription faster than she should have "on a 
regular basis"); that the care received by Harris during the 35 months between the 
incident and his diagnosis was not adequate (Tr. 312:5-8 - "was not a good 
thing"), that if his diagnosis had been made right after the accident, the care she 
received "would have been different" (Tr. 314:14-22), and that past treatment 
would not have been necessary if she had been properly diagnosed (Tr. 314:11-13 -
"treatment would have been discontinued," Tr. 334:3-335:6 - "probable" 
intervening care would not have been necessary). Dr. Rosenthal testified that his 
first diagnosis after the ShopKo incident was facet joint syndrome (Tr. 219:15-20, 
297:14-298:5), a condition which can be caused by degeneration due to aging and 
is not always trauma related (Tr. 298:16-21). 
Dr. Rosenthal also testified that he had no way to tell what will happen in 
the future, that he was "being asked to look into a crystal ball" (Tr. 250:20-22); 
that he had developed a "worst case scenario" to anticipate the need for dilaudid 
(Tr. 324:21-25, 325:12-14); that he could not testify with certainty that Harris 
would need dilaudid in the future (Tr. 250:9-21 - "honestly there's no way to tell 
for certain," 325:5-14 - "I don't know that she won't, but I don't know that she 
10 
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will"); and that the treatment he had anticipated may be more or "it may be less" 
(Tr. 255:22-256:7, 326:5-8). 
Dr. Colledge, Harris' former treating physician (Tr. 550:23-25), testified that 
Plaintiffs pain was chronic (Tr. 584:9-11), and that he could not testify that 
Harris' pain was related to the ShopKo incident (Tr. 585:8-13). Although he 
agreed that the ShopKo incident may have caused soft tissue damage, he went on 
to testify that the pain associated with the soft tissue injury could be expected to 
heal after three to six weeks (Tr. 584: 9-12, 586:10-23 - concerned that she still 
needed dilaudid); that Harris' treatment with chiropractor and massage therapy is 
not the kind of treatment which is going to "give her the kind of relief she's 
looking for" (Tr. 593:25-3), and that medical scientific evidence shows no support 
for massage therapy and chiropractic care (Tr. 594:10-19); that the nerve burning 
treatment does not treat the injury and provides only "short-term relief in about 
half of the patients" (Tr. 621:19-622:3); and that reasonable treatment looks for 
"improvement in function, activities, work hours" (Tr. 587:8-13). Dr. Colledge, in 
addition to challenging the necessary and reasonable nature of the nerve burning 
treatment, chiropractic and massage therapy, testified that Harris should "hold off 
on her future use of pain pills (dilaudid) (Tr. 585:15-586:9 - treatment is to taper 
off of the narcotics). 
11 
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Dr. Colledge also testified he suspected that Plaintiff had an annular tear 
(Opinion below Tf 9; Tr. 576:23-577:5, 593:11-14), which is generally caused by 
degeneration of the disks due to aging (Tr. 577:16-578:10); that he could not 
testify with a "reasonable degree of medical probability that the suspected annular 
tear was a result of the incident at ShopKo" (Tr. 578:11-15); that Harris suffered 
low back pain consistent with degenerative disease with radiating leg pain (Tr. 
580:19-581:25); that Harris suffers from desiccation of the disks which can be "the 
result of just the natural aging process" and is not "typically the result of a single 
incident of trauma" (Tr. 589:22-590:12) and facet disease (Tr. 583:16-17), which is 
the wear of the joints in the spine, and manifests itself as back pain (Tr. 582:3-
583:6); that Plaintiffs complaints may be the result of the degenerative disk 
disease and the facet disease (Tr. 583:14-21); that the sciatica, documented in 2002 
(Tr. 587:23-25), could play a role in her complaints at this time (Tr. 588:10-14); 
and that the degenerative disk disease could be the cause of Plaintiffs current 
complaints (Tr. 591:1-4). He testified that Harris had gained weight which 
negatively impacted her ability to overcome her conditions (Tr. 592:14-593:10). 
He could not testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability that Hams' 
complaints were related to the ShopKo incident (Tr. 585:8-13). 
Dr. Rodney Scuderi, Harris' treating chiropractor admitted that the treatment 
he provided is "soft tissue manipulation . . . akin to massage" (Tr. 368:10-14); that 
12 
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he provided Harris 51 treatment sessions between April 2006 and March 2008 and 
charged Harris $6,200 while providing no lasting cure (Tr. 383:6-20). 
Dr. Scuderi also testified that the pre-existing conditions evidenced in the 
medical records could be the source of Harris's pain (Tr. 387:1-24 "At least it had 
some element. It's not unusual for a patient of Mrs. Harris' age to have some neck 
and back pain."); that the medical records he was asked to consider indicated 
cervical strain, discussed disk herniation, showed Plaintiff suffered diffused neck 
pain following a vehicle accident, and indicated lumbar area pain from 2002 (Tr. 
385:21-386:5). 
Dr. Thomas Cole Snyder, Harris' massage therapist and doctor of 
chiropracty (Tr. 394:4-5), admitted that he treated Harris 27 times from September 
2007 to August 2008 (Tr. 406:1-8), and that Harris and her husband received a 
couple's massage on 1 August 2008 (Tr. 407:22-408:4). 
Dr. Eric Hogenson, Harris' treating family doctor testified that he had 
treated Harris for fibromyalgia, that the onset of the fibromyalgia was years ago, 
going back to May 1997 in the clinic records (Tr. 359:25-360:14), and that 
fibromyalgia is indicated by chronic pains in the muscles, fatigue, sleep problems, 
painful and tender points at certain parts of the body, all symptoms of which Harris 
is currently complaining (Tr. 361:1-362:10). He also testified that Harris had 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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previously indicated in a medical history that she suffered from arthritis (Tr. 
353:13-20). 
Kay Whitaker, Harris' brother and treating nurse practitioner (Tr. 510:7-20, 
511:19-22, 512:19-23), testified that Harris suffered from "SI joint dysfunction," 
(Tr. 535:8-12) which can be caused by degenerative arthritis (Tr. 535:23-536:12) 
and diagnosed Ms. Harris as suffering from chronic pain (Tr. 535:8-9, 538:18-22). 
Harris herself admitted that she suffered no back pain right after the ShopKo 
incident (Tr. 722:5-12); and there was evidence that after the ShopKo incident she 
continued to perform her normal activities, and that her condition became worse 
overtime (Tr. 728:20-730:5). 
Mr. Harris testified that right after the incident Plaintiff continued to work 
and to perform normal activities, but that her condition declined over time (Tr. 
673:23-674:22, 681:9-682:3, 683:8-16). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals erred in holding there was insufficient evidence to 
support giving the apportionment to pre-existing conditions jury instruction 
because there was a lot of evidence on which the jury could rely to conclude that 
Harris' pain was not the result of the ShopKo incident. In holding there was 
insufficient evidence, the court of appeals applied the wrong legal standard 
14 
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(requiring a finding that the pre-existing conditions were symptomatic "on the day 
of the accident") and substituted its judgment on the evidence for that of the jury. 
The court of appeals erred in holding that the apportionment to pre-existing 
conditions requires evidence of symptoms "on the date of the accident" because 
such a bright line rule ignores the causation analysis. The jury instruction is not 
tied to existing pain at the time of the accident but to alleged aggravation of pre-
existing conditions. 
The Biswell v. Duncan decision fails to state the correct legal standard in 
that it goes further than the causal analysis required to establish liability. Biswell 
seems to say that any sequential relationship between pre-existing conditions, 
accident and pain results in liability. To the extent Biswell intended to set up such 
a post hoc analysis devoid of causation it should be overturned. The plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover for all pain and damages suffered after an accident, only those 
damages caused by the accident. With the presence of pre-existing conditions it is 
the aggravation factor which is key to the analysis. 
The court of appeals erred in holding that the apportionment to pre-existing 
conditions jury instruction wrongly affected the outcome of the trial because giving 
the instruction was not error and because even if it was error, it was harmless error. 
A jury's verdict is entitled to great deference and a jury is free to believe the 
evidence it chooses between conflicting evidence. The standard for overturning a 
15 
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jury verdict requires a showing that the evidence compels a different result. In this 
case, there was abundant evidence to support the jury's award of less economic 
damages than sought by the plaintiff, and to support the jury's award of minimal 
noneconomic damages given the minimal nature of the ShopKo incident and the 
conflicting evidence of the cause of Harris' pain after the incident. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THERE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN 
APPORTIONMENT-TO-PRE-EXISTING-CONDITIONS JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
The Court of Appeals decided that there was insufficient evidence to give 
the apportionment-to-pre-existing-conditions jury instruction because it concluded 
that none of the evidence of pre-existing conditions "is capable of supporting a jury 
finding that those conditions were symptomatic on the date of the accident" 
(Opinion below, f21). 
This conclusion was based on the wrong standard for analyzing pre-existing 
conditions: that the apportionment to pre-existing conditions defense can only 
apply if the pre-existing conditions are symptomatic "on the day of the accident." 
As a result, the court of appeal's conclusion overlooks the evidence that Plaintiff 
suffered from chronic pain before the accident (Tr.241:2-12; 359:25-360:14, 
361:1-362:10; 387:1-24; 385:21-386:16; 587:23-588:14); the testimony of her 
former treating physician that the degenerative disk disease could be the cause of 
16 
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Plaintiffs current complaints (Tr.591:l-4); the testimony that Plaintiffs 
complaints are the result of the degenerative disk disease and facet disease, and an 
aggravation of her pre-existing conditions (Tr.583:14-21); Plaintiffs expert's first 
diagnosis after the ShopKo incident of facet joint syndrome (Tr.219:15-20, 297:14-
298:5), a condition caused by degeneration due to aging that is not always trauma 
related (Tr.298:16-21); testimony that Plaintiffs pain may not have been caused by 
the ShopKo incident (Tr.585:8-13); and the testimony that the ShopKo incident 
caused soft tissue damage, which could be expected to heal after three to six weeks 
(Tr.586:9-ll). 
Given the evidence adduced by ShopKo, the trial court was correct to give 
the instruction. There was evidence before the jury that Plaintiffs pain was the 
result of the natural progression of the pre-existing conditions and not the result of 
the ShopKo incident. The jury needed to be instructed on how to address this 
evidence. Parties have the right to have the jury instructed in their theory of the 
case so long as there is competent evidence to support those theories. Black v. 
McKnight, 562 P. 2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977); Christiansen v. UTA, 649 P. 2d 42, 46 
(Utah 1982) ("The rule is that defendants, as well as plaintiffs, are entitled to 
instructions supporting their theory of the case"). 
Relying on Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P. 2d 80, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the 
court of appeals concluded that Plaintiffs pre-existing complaints were "taken care 
17 
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of by the time of the accident" (Opinion below, ffl[17, 24). That standard is not 
only vague (what does "taken care o f mean - does it mean those conditions will 
never on their own cause Harris pain?), but that conclusion also substituted the 
court of appeals' judgment for that of the jury. 
The evidence favorable to ShopKo before the jury included that Harris 
suffered from chronic pain; that her condition was not trauma related; that her 
complaints were the result of the aggravation of her pre-existing-conditions and the 
natural advancement of those conditions; and that Plaintiffs pain was not caused 
by the ShopKo incident. There was also evidence that following the ShopKo 
incident, Harris did not suffer from back pain and continued with her normal 
. activities, but that her general condition declined over time, thus distancing the 
ShopKo incident from her physical complaints at trial. There was sufficient 
evidence that the jury could conclude, contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, that Mrs. 
Harris' complaints were not all the result of the ShopKo incident. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
APPORTIONMENT INSTRUCTION REQUIRES EVIDENCE 
OF A SYMPTOMATIC PRE-EXISTING CONDITION ON THE 
"DATE OF THE ACCIDENT." 
The decision of the court of appeals establishes a bright-line test for when 
the apportionment to pre-existing-conditions jury instruction can be given and 
limits the application of the defense of apportionment for pre-existing-conditions 
18 
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to a single day, the day of the accident. "ShopKo's own briefing of this subject 
contains no record citations to evidence that Harris's pre-existing conditions were 
symptomatic on the date of the accident" (Opinion below, ]|22 underline added). 
"Thus, the crucial question is whether Harris's pre-existing conditions were on the 
date of the accident, latent, dormant, or asymptomatic" (Opinion below, |^23 
underline added). 
This framing of the issue by the court of appeals was facially contrary to this 
Court's decision in Tingey v. Christensen, in which this Court observed that 
evidence of pain from pre-existing conditions 25 days before the accident could 
justify a jury's conclusion "that Tingey's pain and suffering was entirely 
preexisting." Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, ^18; 987 P. 2d 588. Thus the 
"day of the accident" standard is in error. 
The court of appeals' opinion below is based on its Biswell v. Duncan 
decision. Biswell dealt with a plaintiff who wanted a jury instruction that the 
defendant was liable for aggravating Biswell's pre-existing back injury. The trial 
court had refused to give the instruction. The Biswell court held that the plaintiff 
was entitled to his theory of the case being submitted to the jury because there was 
evidence that the accident had aggravated his pre-existing back condition. Biswell 
v. Duncan, 742 P. 2d 80, 81, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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In Biswell, the court of appeals acknowledged that a plaintiff could recover 
for pain from a pre-existing condition made to be painful by the subsequent 
accident. "[W]hen a latent condition itself does not cause pain, but that condition 
plus an injury brings on pain by aggravating the pre-existing condition, then the 
injury, not the dormant condition, is the proximate cause of the pain and 
disability." Id. at 88 (underline added). That statement of the law correctly 
recognizes the causation element required before a plaintiff can recover for pain 
from a pre-existing condition after an accident. The pain from that pre-existing 
condition must be shown to be caused by the subsequent injury. 
Applying this statement of the law supports ShopKo's position in this case 
that the jury instruction was properly given because there was evidence before the 
jury that the pain was not completely caused by Harris' fall from the ShopKo chair. 
There was testimony that the pain was caused by the natural progression of Harris' 
degenerative disk disease (Tr. 580:19-581:25). 
The Biswell decision however, went further, concluding that "[a] plaintiff, 
therefore, is entitled to recover all damages which actually and necessarily follow 
the injury." Id. That statement is far too broad to be a correct statement of the law 
because it sets up a sequential rule devoid of causal relationship. It is not 
axiomatic that all damages which follow an injury will be the result of the accident. 
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Biswell is wrong to the extent it ties the use of the apportionment to pre-existing 
conditions jury instruction to prior chronic pain. 
That statement in Biswell ignores the core causal element established by this 
Court: 
Our view of the basic issue here is that even though it is true that 
one who injures another takes him as he is, nevertheless, the 
plaintiff may not recover damages for any pre-existing condition or 
disability she may have had which did not result from any fault of 
the defendant, but that she is entitled to recover damages for any 
injury she suffered, including any aggravation or lighting up of 
such a pre-existing condition or disability, which was proximately 
caused by the defendant's negligence. 
Brunson v. Strong, 412 P. 2d 451, 453 (Utah 1966). Thus a plaintiff is 
entitled to recover if her pre-existing conditions are aggravated by the 
accident, but is not entitled to recover for pain suffered from her pre-
existing conditions if that pain is not caused by the subsequent accident. A 
pre-existing condition may begin to be painful after an accident because of 
its own advancing condition, independent of the accident. The key to the 
analysis is the aggravation element. To the extent Biswell establishes a 
sequential rule devoid of causation analysis it fails to state the correct legal 
standard. 
The court of appeal's "date of the accident" focus in the decision 
below, like the broad concluding statement in Biswell, leaves out the 
causation element. The fact that a pre-existing condition is not painful "on 
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the date of the accident" and the plaintiff feels pain after the accident does 
not establish causation. Such a rationale suffers from the fallacy of post 
hoc ergo proctor hoc. The plaintiff is not entitled to recover all damages 
which actually follow the accident, only those caused by the accident and 
any aggravation of the pre-existing conditions shown to arise from the 
accident. Whether a pre-existing condition was latent, dormant, or 
asymptomatic is only one of the factors to be analyzed. Therefore, whether 
the pre-existing condition is "taken care o f by the time of the accident 
(Opinion below, Tf24) is not conclusive to the issue. 
In this case, as noted by the court of appeals, much testimony and 
many exhibits were devoted to Harris' pre-existing conditions. (Opinion 
below, ]|27). There was evidence before the jury from which it could have 
concluded that, even if the pre-existing conditions were asymptomatic 
before the incident, they may have been the cause of Harris' pain after the 
ShopKo incident. Some of the pre-existing conditions are degenerative in 
nature and are not caused by trauma. Harris' current complaints at the time 
of trial did not start on the day of the accident. The evidence was that her 
complaints became worse over time. There was evidence that the pain 
from those pre-existing conditions was not caused by the minor fall from 
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the ShopKo chair, which would have created only soft tissue injury which 
healed after a short time. 
Thus, the apportionment instruction was properly given, and the 
court of appeal's "date of the accident" bright line test is not the crucial 
question and is in error. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THE 
APPORTIONMENT INSTRUCTION AFFECTED THE 
OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL. 
As discussed above, giving the apportionment instruction was not error. 
However, even if it was error, it was harmless error and the jury verdict should not 
be overturned. "[T]o reverse a trial verdict, this court must find not a mere 
possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result." Cheves v. 
Williams, 1999 UT 86, 1|20; 993 P. 2d 191. Appellate courts will not reverse a jury 
verdict "where there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict 
on legally sound grounds." Id; Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ^ 14; 29 P. 3d 638. 
Our legal system provides a "general deference towards the jury's role as 
fact-finder." Water & Energy Systems Technology Inc., v. Keil, 2002 UT 32; 48 P. 
3d 888 TJ 15. Because damage assessment is peculiarly a jury function, courts 
should exercise caution in setting aside a verdict. Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., 848 P. 2d at 174; Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P. 2d 179,180 (Utah 1981) (it is 
"the prerogative of the jury to make the determination of damages"). 
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The standard is not whether "the evidence introduced could have justified a 
larger verdict than granted." Meyer v. KK Bartholomew, 690 P. 2d 558, 560 
(Utah 1984), citing to Sprunt v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, 340 P. 2d 
85, 87 (Utah 1959). In Sprunt, this Court observed that: 
The evidence of the actual damage suffered by appellant was not so 
certain that the amount granted is so inadequate as to make it 
appear that it was given under the influence of passion or prejudice 
or that in the interest of justice should be set aside. Id at 88. 
The Court went on in Sprunt to observe that "the jury was not bound to believe" 
the evidence presented by the Plaintiff Id. Thus, courts "cannot substitute [their] 
judgment for that of the fact finder unless the evidence compels a finding that 
reasonable men and women would, of necessity, come to a different conclusion." 
Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P. 2d at 180. 
The court of appeals stated "it is impossible to analyze how the jury came to 
award $1000 in general damages. It is equally impossible to know why the jury 
reduced Hams' claimed economic damages by two-thirds" (opinion below, |^ 25). 
Nonetheless, the court of appeals concluded that "had the improper instruction not 
been given, the jury might have awarded more damages." Id. 
Not knowing why and how a jury arrived at its verdict however is not 
sufficient to conclude that the jury "might" have awarded more if an instruction 
had not been given. Nor is the mere possibility of a different outcome the correct 
standard. Reversing a jury award requires a reasonable likelihood that an error, if 
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there was error in this case, affected the result. Cheves at ^|20; Steffensen v. 
Smith's Management Corp., 862 P. 2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993). "Errors require 
reversal only if confidence in the jury's verdict is undermined." Tingey v. 
Christensen, [^16. Such a conclusion needs to be based on the quality of the 
evidence presented to the jury and whether that evidence forms legally sound 
grounds for the verdict. Green v. Louder, at ^14. 
In this case, the jury had overwhelming evidence that the prior medical 
treatment claimed was neither wholly necessary nor reasonable: Plaintiffs own 
expert testified that she had overused pain pills (Tr.253:15-22 - used prescriptions 
faster than she should have uon a regular basis"), and that past treatment would not 
have been necessary if she had been properly diagnosed (Tr. 314:11-22 - treatment 
would have been discontinued, 334:3-335:6 - intervening treatment probably not 
necessary). Plaintiffs former treating physician challenged the necessity and 
reasonableness of the nerve burning treatment, chiropractic and massage therapy 
(Tr. 593:25-594:19, 621:19-622:3, 587:8-13). 
The jury was presented evidence that Plaintiff sought and received 51 
chiropractic sessions in two years which were soft tissue manipulation akin to 
massages (Tr. 368:10-14; 383:10-12) while also receiving 27 massages (including 
a couple's massage) in one year (Tr. 406:1-8, 407:22-408:4). The evidence also 
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showed that Plaintiff had gained weight which was affecting her prior conditions 
(Tr. 592:14-593:10). 
This evidence of overlapping soft tissue massages/chiropractic treatments, 
overuse of pain pills, and the opinions of both Plaintiffs expert and her former 
treating physician as to the reasonableness and necessity of the past treatments 
support the jury reducing the claimed economic damages for past treatments. 
Likewise, the hesitancy of Harris' own expert as to the necessity of claimed 
future medical treatments (Tr. 250:20-22, 255:22-256:7, 326:5-11, 325:5-14), and 
the Harris' former treating physician's challenge as to the necessity and 
reasonableness of the claimed future treatment plans (Tr.593:25-594:19, 622:18-
24, 587:8-13), both support the reduced amount of economic damages awarded by 
the jury for future treatments. 
Finally, the $1000 noneconomic damages awarded Harris shows that the 
jury recognized that the ShopKo accident had caused her some pain, while also 
reflecting the evidence that the fall from the sample office chair was minor, 
producing only soft tissue injuries (Tr.585:l-7), and that Plaintiffs own weight 
gain had, in part, negatively impacted her ability to overcome her conditions 
(Tr.592:14-593:10). 
Granted that, in addition to the evidence supporting ShopKo, there was 
evidence adduced by Harris to support her claim that her pain was caused by the 
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ShopKo incident, the jury was free to believe some or all or none of the various 
conflicting evidence. Sprunt v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, 340 P. 2d 
85, 87 (Utah 1959) (jury n°t bound to believe all the evidence presented by 
plaintiff); Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 448 P.2d 709, 712 (1968) (jury "not bound to 
slavishly follow the evidence and the figures given by any particular witness"); 
Arnold Mach. Co. v. Intrusion Prepakt, Inc., 357 P.2d 496, 497 (1960) ("the jury 
was not obliged to follow abjectly the plaintiffs evidence, but had the right to place 
[its] evaluation upon ... the witnesses and the weight of the evidence"). 
The evidence before the jury does not compel a conclusion that reasonable 
persons would reach a different decision than the jury, nor does the evidence 
undermine confidence in the jury's verdict. To the contrary, the evidence available 
to the jury supports giving the jury its due deference in deciding damages. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the court of appeal's 
holding and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceeding. 
DATED this 18th day of April, 2012. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
By: ^jLcu^ <^£h j^&fi&r-
Ruth A. Shapiro 
Alain C. Balmanno 
Attorneys for ShopKo Stores, Inc. 
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v. 
SHOPKO STORES, INC., Defendant and Appellee. 
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Sept. 29, 2011. 
Background: Customer filed negligence action 
against store for injuries sustained when sample office 
chair in which she was sitting fell apart and she fell to 
floor. The Fourth District Court, American Fork De-
partment, Christine S. Johnson, J., entered judgment 
on jury awards to customer of $25,000 in economic 
damages and $1,000 in noneconomic damages. Cus-
tomer appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Voros, J., held that: 
(1) evidence did not support an instruction on appor-
tionment of damages; and 
(2) improper instruction on apportionment of damages 
was prejudicial to customer. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
i l l Appeal and Error 30 €^>842(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVKA) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(l) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
A trial court's decision regarding jury instructions 
presents a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness. 
Page 1 
J21 Damages 115 €^>216(1) 
115 Damages 
115X Proceedings for Assessment 
115k209 Instructions 
115k216 Measure of Damages for Injuries 
to the Person 
115k216(l) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Evidence did not support an instruction on ap-
portionment of damages, in negligence action against 
store by customer who fell to floor when sample office 
chair in which she was setting fell apart, where cus-
tomer's pre-existing conditions were asymptomatic at 
time of fall. 
]31 Trial 388 €=^203(1) 
388 Trial 
388VII Instructions to Jury 
388VIKB) Necessity and Subject-Matter 
388k203 Issues and Theories of Case in 
General 
388k203(l) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
All parties are entitled to have their theories of the 
case submitted to the jury in the court's instructions, 
provided there is competent evidence to support them. 
141 Trial 388 €^203(1) 
388 Trial 
388VII Instructions to Jury 
388VIKB) Necessity and Subject-Matter 
388k203 Issues and Theories of Case in 
General 
388k203(l) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
A trial court may not instruct the jury on a theory 
of the evidence unless a rational jury could find a 
factual basis in the evidence to support that theory. 
J51 Damages 115 €^221(7) 
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115 Damages 
115X Proceedings for Assessment 
115k219 Verdict and Findings 
115k221 Special Interrogatories and Find-
ings by Jury 
115k221(7) k. Sufficiency of verdict or 
findings. Most Cited Cases 
If the jury can find a reasonable basis for appor-
tioning damages between a pre-existing condition and 
a subsequent tort, it should do so, but, if the jury finds 
it impossible to apportion damages, it should find that 
the tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount of dam-
ages. 
i£Damagesl l5€^33 
115 Damages 
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory 
Damages 
115111(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or 
Prospective Consequences or Losses 
115111(A)! In General 
115k31 Physical Suffering and Incon-
venience 
115k33 k. Aggravation of previous 
injury, disease, or disability. Most Cited Cases 
The tortfeasor takes the victim as he finds her and 
bears the burden of any uncertainty in the amount of 
the victim's damages. 
121 Damages 115 €^>33 
115 Damages 
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory 
Damages 
115111(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or 
Prospective Consequences or Losses 
115111(A)! In General 
115k31 Physical Suffering and Incon-
venience 
115k33 k. Aggravation of previous 
injury, disease, or disability. Most Cited Cases 
When a defendant's negligence aggravates or 
lights up a latent, dormant, or asymptomatic condition, 
or one to which the injured person is predisposed, the 
defendant is liable to the injured person for the full 
amount of damages which ensue, notwithstanding 
such diseased or weakened condition. 
181 Workers' Compensation 413 €^>552 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be 
Had 
413VIIKA) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIII(A)4 Aggravation of Previously 
Impaired Condition 
413k552 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Under workers' compensation analysis as to 
whether an injury arose out of and in the course of 
employment, it matters not at all, from the standpoint 
of legal causation, whether the preexisting condition 
was symptomatic or asymptomatic. 
M Trial 388 €=^228(1) 
388 Trial 
388VII Instructions to Jury 
388VIKC) Form, Requisites, and Sufficiency 
388k228 Form and Language 
388k228(l) k. Form and arrangement. 
Most Cited Cases 
As a general rule, the Model Utah Jury Instruc-
tions are merely advisory and do not necessarily rep-
resent correct statements of Utah law. 
HOI Damages 115 €=^33 
115 Damages 
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory 
Damages 
115111(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or 
Prospective Consequences or Losses 
115111(A)! In General 
115k31 Physical Suffering and Incon-
venience 
115k33 k. Aggravation of previous 
injury, disease, or disability. Most Cited Cases 
When a latent condition itself does not cause pain, 
but that condition plus an injury brings on pain by 
aggravating the pre-existing condition, then the injury, 
not the dormant condition, is the proximate cause of 
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the pain and disability. 
[Ill Appeal and Error 30 €^1064.1(8) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVKJ) Harmless Error 
30XVI(J)18 Instructions 
30kl064 Prejudicial Effect 
30kl 064.1 In General 
30k 1064.1(2) Particular Cases 
30kl064.1(8) k. Negligence 
and torts in general. Most Cited Cases 
Improper instruction on apportionment of dam-
ages was prejudicial to customer who brought negli-
gence action against store in connection with her fall 
when sample office chair in which she was sitting fell 
apart, where jury awarded customer only one-third, 
i.e., $25,000 of the economic damages she claimed 
and only $1,000 in economic damages, much testi-
mony and many exhibits were devoted to customer's 
pre-existing conditions, and there was no evidence 
that those conditions were symptomatic at time of 
incident at issue. 
[121 Appeal and Error 30 €^1064.1(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVKJ) Harmless Error 
30XVI(J)18 Instructions 
30k 1064 Prejudicial Effect 
30kl 064.1 In General 
30kl064.1(l) k. In general. Most 
Cited Cases 
The failure to give a jury instruction to which a 
party is entitled, or the giving of an instruction to 
which a party was not entitled, may constitute re-
versible error only if it tends to mislead the jury to the 
prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or 
erroneously advises the jury on the law. 
*1185 Michael E. Day and Nathan Whittaker, Murray, 
for Appellant. 
Ruth A. Shapiro and Alain C. Balmanno, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges DAVIS, VOROS, and CHRISTIAN-
SEN. 
*1186 OPINION 
VOROS, Judge: 
Tj 1 Plaintiff Wendy Harris sued Defendant 
ShopKo Stores, Inc. for personal injuries sustained 
when she sat in a sample office chair that fell apart, 
causing her to fall to the floor. At the conclusion of 
trial, the jury awarded approximately one-third of her 
claimed economic damages and $1,000 in noneco-
nomic damages. Harris contends on appeal that the 
jury was erroneously instructed on the apportionment 
of damages between those attributable to the ShopKo 
incident and those attributable to her various 
pre-existing conditions. We agree and accordingly 
reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
I] 2 While shopping for an office chair in a 
ShopKo store, Harris sat in a display model. When she 
did, the chair split apart and the seat of the chair fell 
out from under her. She fell straight down and landed 
on her wrist and tailbone. Shortly after the accident, 
Harris went to the hospital because she felt "deep 
pelvic pain" and worried that "something had come 
loose"—possibly a complication from her previous 
surgery. The pain in her wrist resolved on its own after 
a few days, but the pain in her lower back and tailbone 
intensified over time. 
H 3 Harris sought medical help from a family 
nurse practitioner, a physical therapist, a chiropractor, 
and various physicians. The physicians treating her 
observed that she was suffering from severe pain in 
her lower back and tailbone and that the pain radiated 
down the back of her leg to her knee. Even after three 
years, the pain did not resolve. To ease the pain, Harris 
tried medication, chiropractic treatment, physical 
therapy, and massage therapy. She was prescribed a 
variety of medications including a painkiller, which, 
according to Dr. Richard Rosenthal, a physician spe-
cializing in pain management, she sometimes took 
more of than the prescribed amount. She visited a 
physical therapist four times, went to fifty-one chiro-
practic sessions, and had twenty-seven massage 
treatments, including one couples massage with her 
husband. 
% 4 Three years after the accident, Dr. Rosenthal 
diagnosed her with facet joint syndrome, an inflam-
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mation of one of the spinal joints, and coccydinia, 
inflammation of the tailbone. He treated her facet joint 
syndrome with a radio frequency lesioning treatment, 
which severs the nerve to the facet joint and stops the 
pain. 
H 5 Harris sued ShopKo, alleging negligence. She 
also sued Office Star Products, the manufacturer of the 
chair, but Office Star was dismissed before trial. The 
case went to trial before a jury. 
H 6 At trial, Dr. Rosenthal testified that it was 
more likely than not that Harris's pain and injuries 
were caused by the ShopKo accident. He testified that 
her medical expenses were reasonable and necessary. 
He also stated that he thought her pain would ulti-
mately resolve but that she might have permanent loss 
of mobility in her spine and may develop sciatica or 
other complications from her injuries. He also testified 
that she had sustained permanent injuries that would 
require future medical care costing approximately 
$39,574. Dr. Rosenthal also testified that Harris had 
been in three prior auto accidents and had received 
treatment for neck pain and possibly lower back pain. 
He also testified that facet joint syndrome can be 
caused by degeneration due to aging and is not trauma 
related. 
K 7 Harris's family practitioner testified that Har-
ris's low back pain started after the ShopKo incident. 
He also testified that records from his clinic indicated 
that Harris had complained of fibromyalgia and de-
pression several years before the ShopKo incident. A 
nurse practitioner, who is also Harris's brother, testi-
fied that he treated her for low back pain following the 
accident. He also testified that her X-rays following 
the ShopKo incident showed no fractures. 
11 8 Dr. Rodney Scuderi, Harris's chiropractor, 
also testified. He stated that he first treated her one 
week after the ShopKo incident. On that day, he ex-
plained, "She had trouble even walking. Even coming 
back to the [examination] room took a great amount of 
time. She couldn't sit. It was with great difficulty to 
even get her down on *1187 the table." Harris visited 
him fifty-one times over approximately two years, but 
Dr. Scuderi said that although he could sometimes 
provide relief, "it would never fix anything.'7 On 
cross-examination, ShopKo's counsel presented Dr. 
Scuderi with a series of Harris's medical records from 
past incidents. The records showed a 1998 visit to Aha 
View Hospital for cervical strain and possible disc 
herniation; a 2001 visit to Alta View Hospital for 
diffuse neck pain and neck strain following a car ac-
cident; a 2002 visit to Alta View Hospital for excru-
ciating discomfort in the lumbar area resulting in a 
diagnosis of left leg pain and questionable sciatica. Dr. 
Scuderi indicated that while it appeared that Harris 
had previously experienced neck and back pain, such 
pain was not unusual for a person of her age. He also 
indicated that when he first saw her, her symptoms 
were more consistent with someone who had suffered 
a recent injury than someone with chronic back pain. 
U 9 Dr. Allan Colledge, one of Harris's former 
treating physicians, testified for ShopKo. He had 
treated Harris five times since the ShopKo incident. 
He agreed that Harris was in "extraordinary" pain but 
testified that her MRI and X-rays were "normal" and 
her sacroiliac joint seemed "fairly normal." He 
thought she had an annular tear, but the radiologist did 
not. He indicated that a traumatic event, such as Har-
ries fall at ShopKo, can cause previously asympto-
matic disc degeneration to flare up and cause pain. 
11 10 Dr. Colledge also testified concerning "de-
layed recovery," a term used to describe nonphysical 
factors that can prolong recovery. He stated that Harris 
had some indicators for delayed recovery, including 
the length of time she was in pain, the use of narcotics, 
and the fact that she was involved in personal injury 
litigation. He did not, however, think she was malin-
gering or suffering from hysteria or hypochondriasis. 
H 11 Ultimately, Harris presented evidence that 
her past medical expenses were $33,203.34. This 
included $17,137.50 in doctor and hospital visits, 
$7,539.84 in prescriptions, $768 in physical therapy 
visits, $1,579 in massage therapy visits, and $6,179 in 
chiropractic visits. She presented evidence that her 
future medical expenses were estimated at $39,574. 
This included visits at the pain clinic, nerve-burning 
procedures, annual check-ups, massage therapy, 
medication, and a coccyx seat support. The jury 
awarded $25,000 in economic damages ($15,000 in 
past medical expenses and $10,000 in future medical 
expenses) and $1,000 in noneconomic damages. 
H 12 Harris moved for a new trial; the trial court 
denied the motion. Harris appeals, alleging various 
errors. 
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
£U Tl 13 Harris presents eleven issues on appeal. 
Among these is her contention that the trial court erred 
when it instructed the jury regarding apportioning 
damages between those caused by the ShopKo inci-
dent and those caused by pre-existing conditions. "A 
trial court's decision regarding jury instructions pre-
sents a question of law, which is reviewed for cor-
rectness." Vitale v. Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359, 
361 (Utah Ct.App.1996). Because we determine that 
this claim of error requires reversal, we do not address 
the remaining issues. 
ANALYSIS 
[2] U 14 Harris contends that the trial court erred 
in instructing the jury on apportioning damages be-
tween those caused by the accident and those caused 
by symptomatic pre-existing conditions. This was 
error, she contends, because no evidence of sympto-
matic pre-existing conditions was adduced at trial. 
[3][4] T| 15 "A trial court's ruling concerning a 
jury instruction is reviewed for correctness." Pernios v. 
Covenant Transp.. Inc.. 2004 UT App 35, H 10, 86 
P.3d 752 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). "All parties are entitled to have their theories of 
the case submitted to the jury in the court's instruc-
tions, provided there is competent evidence to support 
them." Id_ (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). A trial court may not instruct the jury on a 
theory of the evidence unless a rational jury could find 
a factual basis in the evidence to support *1188 that 
theory. See State v. White. 2011 UT 21,1] 22, 251 P.3d 
820. 
[5][6] K 16 The parties do not dispute the rules 
governing pre-existing conditions in the negligence 
context. "[T]he plaintiff may not recover damages for 
any pre-existing condition or disability she may have 
had which did not result from any fault of the de-
fendant, but ... she is entitled to recover damages for 
any injury she suffered, including any aggravation or 
lighting up of such a pre-existing condition or disa-
bility, which was proximately caused by the defend-
ant's negligence." Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 
412 P.2d 451, 453 (1966). Thus, "if the jury can find a 
reasonable basis for apportioning damages between a 
pre-existing condition and a subsequent tort, it should 
do so; however, if the jury finds it impossible to ap-
portion damages, it should find that the tortfeasor is 
liable for the entire amount of damages." Tingev v. 
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Christensen. 1999 UT 68, <H 15. 987 P.2d 588. These 
rules follow from several well-accepted principles, 
among them that the tortfeasor takes the victim as he 
finds her and that the tortfeasor bears the burden of 
any uncertainty in the amount of the victim's damages. 
See id. ^ 14. 
[7][8] \ 17 Furthermore, and most relevant here, a 
victim with latent, dormant, or otherwise asympto-
matic pre-existing conditions stands on equal footing 
with a victim with no pre-existing conditions; the 
tortfeasor is liable for the full amount of resulting 
damages when its conduct aggravates or "lights up" an 
asymptomatic pre-existing condition: 
The rule is well settled that when a defendant's 
negligence aggravates or lights up a latent, dormant, 
or asymptomatic condition, or one to which the in-
jured person is predisposed, the defendant is liable 
to the injured person for the full amount of damages 
which ensue, notwithstanding such diseased or 
weakened condition. In other words, when a latent 
condition itself does not cause pain, but that condi-
tion plus an injury brings on pain by aggravating the 
pre-existing condition, then the injury, not the 
dormant condition, is the proximate cause of the 
pain and disability. A plaintiff, therefore, is entitled 
to recover all damages which actually and neces-
sarily follow the injury. 
Biswell v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). The facts in Biswell v. Duncan. 742 
P.2d 80 (Utah Ct.App.1987), parallel those at bar. 
Biswell was injured in a traffic accident. See id. at 81. 
Before the accident, she suffered from degenerative 
changes in her spine and upper back. See id. at 82. 
However, she testified that her condition had been 
"taken care o f and that at the time of the accident she 
was symptom-free. See id. at 82. On these facts, we 
held that she was entitled to a jury instruction "which 
clearly expresses the concept that if [the defendant's] 
negligence aggravated or lit up Biswell's dormant 
asymptomatic condition, then Biswell is entitled to 
recover all the damages which follow." Id. at 89 
(emphasis omitted); see also Ortiz v. Geneva Rock 
Prods.. Inc.. 939P.2d 1213. 1219 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) 
(rejecting plaintiffs claim that evidence of his 
pre-existing conditions was irrelevant, on the ground 
that medical testimony called into question plaintiffs 
claim that those pre-existing conditions were la-
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FNL A different rule applies in worker's 
compensation cases where the legal question 
is whether an injury arose out of or in the 
course of employment. "When analyzing 
whether an injury arose out of and in the 
course of employment, it matters not at all, 
from the standpoint of legal causation, 
whether the preexisting condition was 
symptomatic or asymptomatic." Acosta v. 
Labor Comm'n. 2002 UT App 67, ^ 27, 44 
P.3d819. 
mental condition before the time of the 
March 29, 2006 incident is not entitled to 
recover damages for that pre-existing 
condition or disability. 
However, if a person has a pre-existing 
condition that does not cause pain or disa-
bility, but the March 29, 2006 incident 
causes the person to suffer physical, emo-
tional or mental suffering, Wendy Harris 
may recover all damages caused by the 
event. 
1) 18 In keeping with the foregoing principles of 
law, the Model Utah Jury Instructions (MUJI) offer 
two different jury instructions for use in cases in-
volving pre-existing conditions. Instruction CV2018 
is designed for cases involving "[aggravation of 
symptomatic pre-existing conditions." See MUJI 2d 
CV2018 (Utah State Bar 2011), available at http:// 
www. utcourts. gov/ resources/ muji. It explains that 
the jury should, if it can, apportion damages between 
those resulting from the pre-existing condition and 
those resulting from the accident, and that if it cannot, 
it should treat all damages as caused by the accident. 
See id. CV2019 is designed to be used in cases in-
volving aggravation of "dormant pre-existing condi-
tions." See id. *1189 CV2019. It instructs the jury that 
all damages caused by the accident are recoverable. 
See id. 
[9] |^ 19 Here, the trial court gave a jury instruc-
tion based on CV2019. — However, over Harris's 
objection, it also gave a jury instruction based on 
CV2018. That instruction stated that "[i]f Plaintiff had 
a physical, emotional, or mental condition before the 
time of the March 29, 2006 incident, she is not entitled 
to recover damages for that condition or disability," 
but that the jury should, if it is able, apportion dam-
ages between those attributable to Harris's pre-existing 
condition and those attributable to the ShopKo fall.— 
The form of the instruction is not at issue.— Harris 
objected to this instruction on the ground that no trial 
evidence supported a finding that she was suffering 
from any pain at the time of the accident. The trial 
court denied the objection on the basis that evidence of 
pre-existing conditions had been presented: 
FN2. Instruction No. 24 read as follows: 
A person who has a physical, emotional or 
Although modeled on MUJI CV2019, this 
instruction is not a model of clarity. For 
example, it never clearly states the gov-
erning rule that "when a defendant's neg-
ligence aggravates or lights up a latent, 
dormant, or asymptomatic condition, or 
one to which the injured person is predis-
posed, the defendant is liable to the injured 
person for the full amount of damages 
which ensue, notwithstanding such dis-
eased or weakened condition." Biswell v. 
Duncan. 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). A clearer instruction was 
given in Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, 
Inc.. 939 P.2d 1213 (Utah Ct.App.1997): 
A person who has a latent, dormant or 
asymptomatic condition, or a condition to 
which the person is predisposed, may re-
cover the full amount of damages that 
proximately result from injuries that ag-
gravate the condition. In other words, 
when a latent condition does not cause 
pain, but that condition plus the injury 
brings on pain by aggravating the preex-
isting, dormant or asymptomatic condition, 
then it is the injury, not the dormant or 
asymptomatic condition, that is the prox-
imate cause of pain and disability. 
A/, at 1219 n. 5. 
FN3. Instruction No. 23 read as follows: 
If Plaintiff had a physical, emotional, or 
mental condition before the time of the 
March 29, 2006 incident, she is not entitled 
to recover damages for that condition or 
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disability. However, Plaintiff is entitled to 
recover damages for any aggravation of the 
pre-existing condition that was caused by 
Defendant's fault, even if Plaintiffs 
pre-existing condition made her more 
vulnerable to physical or emotional harm 
than the average person. This is true even if 
another person may not have suffered any 
harm from the event at all. 
When a pre-existing condition makes the 
damages from injuries greater than they 
would have been without the condition, it 
is your duty to try to determine what por-
tion of the physical, emotional or mental 
harm to Plaintiff was caused by the 
pre-existing condition and what portion 
was caused by the March 29, 2006 fall. 
If you are not able to make such an appor-
tionment, then you must conclude that the 
entire physical, emotional and mental harm 
to Plaintiff was caused by Defendant's 
fault. 
FN4. The wording of the instruction was 
taken directly from Model Utah Jury In-
struction CV2018, see MUJI CV2018. As a 
general rule, the Model Utah Jury Instruc-
tions are "merely advisory and do not nec-
essarily represent correct statements of Utah 
law." Jones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp., 
944 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1997). This partic-
ular rule, however, is an amended form of a 
jury instruction that was previously sanc-
tioned as a correct statement of Utah law. See 
Tinzev v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, Tffl 12, 
15, 987P.2d588. Neither party contends that 
the instruction given was not an accurate 
statement of Utah law. 
Shopko presented substantial evidence that Harris's 
injuries could be attributed to alternative sources 
[other than the Shopko incident], both through cross 
examination of [Harris's] witnesses, and through 
affirmative testimony from its own witnesses. Har-
ris had a history of neck and back pain, her medical 
records included references to fibromyalgia, and 
testimony also included the opinion that her current 
condition was not trauma-related, but caused by 
degenerative disk disease. In short, testimony was 
conflicted with regard to the cause of Harris's con-
dition. 
T| 20 Harris renews her attack on appeal. She ar-
gues that ShopKo "presented no evidence that would 
provide a reasonable basis for determining the portion 
of damages attributable for each injury, and there was 
no *1190 evidence of symptomatic pre-existing con-
ditions." — ShopKo does not dispute the law upon 
which Harris relies, but maintains that "there was 
testimony from Harris's own doctors that the 
pre-existing conditions could be the source of her 
pain." 
FN5. Harris also frames her claim as an at-
tack on the trial court's refusal to order a new 
trial based on the ground that the evidence 
was insufficient to support the jury's damage 
award. 
K 21 In support of her challenge, Harris pains-
takingly marshals the evidence that, in her words, 
"could be construed in favor of the trial court's deci-
sion." Her effort consumes six pages of her brief 
containing over seventy citations to the record on 
appeal. She catalogs her prior episodes of low back 
pain; her three prior auto accidents and resulting neck 
and spine pain; her possible fibromyalgia; Dr. 
Colledge's testimony that she suffered from a suspect 
annular tear and disc bulge, dessication of her spinal 
discs, age-related degenerative disc disease, and pos-
sible facet joint syndrome; her prior diagnosis of sci-
atica and subsequent diagnosis of arthritis; and a va-
riety of other less relevant medical conditions.— 
"After constructing this magnificent array of sup-
porting evidence," Harris proceeds to "ferret out a 
fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City v. Ma-
jestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311. 1315 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991). She shows that, while the evidence of 
Harris's pre-existing conditions was substantial, none 
of it is capable of supporting a jury finding that those 
conditions were symptomatic on the date of the acci-
dent. 
FN6. We thus do not agree with ShopKo that 
Harris "lightly glossed over" her marshaling 
burden. 
H 22 This conclusion is tacitly confirmed by 
ShopKo's brief. Although ShopKo chides Harris for 
the "fragment[s] of evidence Harris deigns to men-
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tion," ShopKo's own briefing of this subject contains 
no record citations to evidence that Harris's 
pre-existing conditions were symptomatic on the date 
of the accident. Rather, it summarizes in a single 
sentence the evidence of her pre-existing conditions, 
stating that several health professionals testified that 
these pre-existing conditions "could be the cause of 
Harris's current complaints." From this ShopKo con-
cludes that, in contrast to Biswell, "there was testi-
mony from Harris's own doctors that the pre-existing 
conditions could be the source of her pain." These 
statements, though accurate as far as they go, do not 
respond to Harris's central point. 
[10] H 23 As stated above, "when a defendant's 
negligence aggravates or lights up a latent, dormant, or 
asymptomatic condition, or one to which the injured 
person is predisposed, the defendant is liable to the 
injured person for the full amount of damages which 
ensue, notwithstanding such diseased or weakened 
condition." Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). "In other words, when a latent condi-
tion itself does not cause pain, but that condition plus 
an injury brings on pain by aggravating the 
pre-existing condition, then the injury, not the 
dormant condition, is the proximate cause of the pain 
and disability." IcL Thus, the crucial question is 
whether Harris's pre-existing conditions were, on the 
date of the accident, "latent, dormant, or asympto-
matic," see icL Harris adamantly contends that they 
were. ShopKo makes no attempt to refute her conten-
tion. 
U 24 Based on Harris's marshaling of the evi-
dence, ShopKo's response, and our own careful ex-
amination of the record on appeal, we see no evidence 
capable of supporting a jury finding that Harris's 
pre-existing complaints of head, neck, back, and 
shoulder pain were anything but—to borrow BiswelFs 
phrase—"taken care o f by the time of the accident. 
Id. at 82. We therefore agree with Harris that no evi-
dence supported the jury instruction on apportionment 
of damages and, consequently, that giving the in-
struction was error. 
[11]|T2] H 25 However, "[w]e may reverse a trial 
court judgment only if there is a reasonable likelihood 
that, absent the error, there would have been a result 
more favorable to the complaining party." Robinson v. 
All-Star Deliveiy, Inc., 1999 UT 109, H 16, 992 P.2d 
969 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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"The failure to give a jury instruction to which a party 
is entitled"—or in this case, giving an instruction to 
which a party was not entitled—"may constitute re-
versible*! 191 error only if it tends to mislead the jury 
to the prejudice of the complaining party or insuffi-
ciently or erroneously advises the jury on the law." IcL 
As in Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 
109, H 18, 992 P.2d 969, "[i]t is impossible to analyze 
how the jury came to award $1000 in general dam-
ages." Id. H 18. It is equally impossible to know why 
the jury reduced Harris's claimed economic damages 
by two-thirds. However, given the nature and volume 
of the evidence concerning Harris's pre-existing con-
ditions, the lack of evidence indicating that those 
conditions were symptomatic at the time of the acci-
dent, and the level of the damage awards, we conclude 
that, had the jury not been erroneously permitted to 
reduce Harris's damages due to asymptomatic 
pre-existing conditions, that is, "had the [improper] 
instruction [not] been given, the jury might have 
awarded more" damages. See id, ShopKo under-
standably does not argue otherwise. 
H 26 "Our decision to reverse and remand for re-
trial renders the remaining issues on appeal moot." 
State v. Sellers, 2011 UT App 38,11 23. 248 P.3d 70. 
We recognize that if an appellate court grants a new 
trial, it "may pass upon and determine all questions of 
law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and 
necessary to the final determination of the case." Utah 
R.App. P. 30(a); see also Bair v. Axiom Design LLC, 
2001 UT20,1120,20P.3d388 ("[W]here an appellate 
court finds that it is necessary to remand a case for 
further proceedings, it has the duty of pass[ing] on 
matters which may then become material" (second 
alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Here, however, even if the case is 
retried, the remaining issues thoroughly briefed on 
appeal are either unlikely to recur on retrial or unlikely 
to recur in a factual context sufficiently similar to the 
instant one as to make addressing them now, on bal-
ance, "helpful to the parties and the court as the case 
proceeds." See Sellers. 2011 UT App 38, 11 23, 248 
P.3d 70. 
CONCLUSION 
H 27 At trial, much testimony and many exhibits 
were devoted to Harris's pre-existing conditions. 
However, no witness testified, and no exhibit indi-
cated, that those conditions were symptomatic on the 
date of the ShopKo incident. ShopKo identifies no 
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such evidence, and our own examination of the record 
has disclosed none. We therefore conclude that under 
controlling law the evidence offered no basis to in-
struct the jury on apportioning Harris's damages be-
tween those attributable to the accident and those 
attributable to pre-existing conditions. The trial court's 
instruction on this point was, consequently, erroneous. 
We further conclude that the error was prejudicial. We 
therefore reverse the ruling of the trial court and re-
mand for further proceedings consistent with this 
decision. 
H 28 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS. Presiding 
Judge and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN. Judge. 
UtahApp.,2011. 
Harris v. ShopKo Stores, Inc. 
263 P.3d 1184, 692 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 2011 UT App 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WENDY HARRIS, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, Civil No. 070101906 
vs. Date: December 23,2009 
SHOPKO STORES, INC., JUDGE CHRISTINE S. JOHNSON 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial, or in the 
Alternative, Additur, received by this Court together with a Memorandum in Support on August 
31,2009. Shopko filed its Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion on September 15, 2009. Harris filed 
her Reply Memorandum on October 12, 2009. The court heard oral arguments on the pending 
motion on November 16, 2009. Plaintiff was present with counsel, Mr. Nathan Whitaker and 
Mr. Michael Day. Shopko was present through counsel Alain Balmanno. Having considered 
arguments presented, having reviewed the file and pleadings submitted by counsel, and having 
reviewed the applicable law, the Court now makes the following findings and conclusions: 
Memorandum Decision 
Page 1 of 24 
JAM 8 4 2010 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
BACKGROUND 
1. It is not necessary to provide here a lengthy recitation of the facts, as they are fully 
preserved in the record. The following are summarized facts pertinent to the motion 
before the court, granting the jury deference in its role as the fact-finder, and recognizing 
that for the purposes of a motion for a new trial, the court should view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the verdict. Tingey v. Christensen, 987 P.2d 425, at | 7 (Utah 
1999). 
2. This action centers around an incident which occurred at Defendant Shopko's retail 
establishment located in Orem, Utah. The incident occurred on March 29, 2006, when 
Harris was shopping for an office chair. Harris attempted to sit down in a model chair, 
which was held out as an example of chairs which were offered for purchase. In the 
process of sitting on the chair, the seat pad detached from the base and Harris fell to the 
floor. Harris experienced immediate physical pain from her fall and sought medical 
treatment for her injuries after returning home. She later filed this action, attributing 
negligence to Shopko for their failure to properly assemble the chair and requesting 
economic damages for both her existing and future medical expenses, as well as non-
economic damages. 
3. Trail was conducted from July 13-16, 2009. At the trial, Harris brought forward the 
testimony of various medical providers to describe her physical injuries from the Shopko 
incident and the treatment she has received. The primary injury was described as 
continuing pain in her lower back and coccyx. Harris's treatments since the accident 
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have included massage therapy, chiropractic adjustments, pain medications, and 
ultimately a spinal nerve-burning procedure. Future similar procedures are anticipated. 
Harris presented testimony that her injury was caused by the Shopko incident, and that 
these procedures have been both reasonable and necessary. 
4. Testimony elicited by Shopko countered that Harris suffered from pre-existing 
conditions, including fibromyalgia and other various complaints of back and neck pain 
over a period of years. Harris's chiropractor conceded that Harris's pre-existing 
conditions could be a source of her pain. Testimony further described that Harris's 
current complaints could be age-related and attributable to the unrelated condition of 
degenerative disc disorder. Neither party attempted to provide a specific estimate with 
regard to how much of Harris's pain was attributable to the incident at Shopko, and how 
much was attributable to these other conditions. 
5. Additionally, trial testimony included medical evidence critical of the treatment Harris 
had received. A former treating physician of Harris, Dr. College, elaborated that much of 
the treatment sought by Harris was not useful. Specifically, massage therapy and 
chiropractic care were not helpful in treating her condition and, based on medical 
evidence, they had not helped improve Harris's functioning. One invoice for message 
therapy indicated that Harris had received a couple's massage, which was clearly not 
therapeutic in nature. Dr. College also expressed skepticism in the nerve-burning 
procedure, as it did nothing to address the underlying tissue injury. He further testified 
that Harris abused the painkillers prescribed to her,, and that this abuse actually tends to 
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intensify pain for chronic pain sufferers like Hams. Harris's current physician, Dr. 
Rosenthal, also confirmed that Harris had been abusing her narcotic medication, 
6. With regard to future medical expenses sought by Harris, medical testimony was less than 
clear about what would be required. Dr. Rosenthal testified that knowing Harris's future 
needs was akin to looking into a crystal ball and that he could not testify with a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Harris would need the future pain medication 
which was requested as part of the award for future damages. 
7. The jury found Shopko negligent but awarded a lesser amount of damages than Harris 
requested. Harris followed by filing the present motion, requesting a new trial, or 
alternatively an additur, due to multiple argued errors at trial. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
8. Harris makes her motion pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which states in relevant part that a new trial or additur of damages may be granted when, 
inter alia, there is "irregularity in the proceedings of the court" or there are "excessive or 
inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice," or there is an "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision." Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(l )9 (5)-(6). 
9. The jury is entitled to a large degree of deference in its role in making a damage award. 
A motion for a new trial should be granted "only where it is obvious that the jury lacked a 
reasonable basis for its decision, acted with prejudice or passion, or disregarded 
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competent evidence." Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.> 848 P.2d 171,174 (UT 
Appl993). 
Plaintiff $ Deposition Transcript 
10. Harris first asserts that the Court erroneously excluded portions of her transcript, 
preventing her from clarifying other portions which had been introduced by Shopko on 
cross-examination. This error, Harris claims, was prejudicial as it prevented her from 
rehabilitating her credibility7. 
11. Shopko responds that Defense counsel did not object to Plaintiffs use of the deposition 
transcript itself Rather, Defense counsel merely objected that Plaintiffs counsel had not 
asked the witness a question regarding the transcript. 
12. Indeed, the Court did not rule at trial that Harris's deposition transcript was excluded. 
This Court's ruling was limited merely to directing Plaintiffs counsel to elicit the 
proposed testimony regarding the deposition in the form of a question. Counsel then 
initiated a question, but then withdrew it and closed his re-direct of his witness. 
13. The Court agrees that it was likely prejudicial to Ms. Harris that she was not able to 
further explain her deposition testimony. However, any prejudice from this is not 
attributable to the Court. The Court directed Plaintiffs counsel that he could ask Ms. 
Harris a question about the transcript. Counsel failed to do so. 
Specifications of the Chair 
14. Harris claims that a new trial or additur is warranted based upon the court's ruling at trial 
excluding the specifications of the suspect chair from evidence. 
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15. Through Plaintiffs Requests for Admission no. 6, served on Defendant on April 65 2009, 
Shopko had admitted that Office Star Model #2993 was the type of chair at issue in the 
case, and that the photographs and instructions attached were accurate. In preparation for 
trial, counsel on both sides stipulated to the admission of numerous documents; however, 
the specifications for the chair were not included among those stipulated documents. At 
trial, Harris showed the specifications of the chair to an entry-level employee of Shopko, 
Sean Briggs, in what appeared to be an attempt to lay foundation for the document. 
Shopko objected to the foundation under Rule 901 and the court sustained the objection. 
16. URE 901 describes what is required for foundation of documentary evidence as follows: 
"The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to 
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims." The rule elaborates that foundation may be 
provided by "[tjestimony of witness with knowledge." Utah R. Evid. 901 (b)(l). 
17. Sean Briggs appeared to have no knowledge of the document being shown to him, and 
was not a witness with knowledge under Rule 901. 
18. Harris asserts that Shopko had waived its foundational objection to the document by not 
objecting to it within 14 days pursuant to Rule 26, However, Rule 26 allows the court to 
excuse any waiver "for good cause shown." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 26(a)(4)(d). The court 
found good cause, as the witness on the stand did not appear to have any knowledge 
surrounding the document, and because the court deemed that the document, if it had 
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been admitted to through discovery, ought to have been included with the other stipulated 
documents which were already before the court. 
19. In any case, even should the exclusion of this document be deemed error, there is no 
support for the position that Plaintiff was prejudiced by it. An exemplar chair was used 
as a demonstrative exhibit throughout the trial to show the jury the type of chair that was 
at issue in the incident. Plaintiffs primary argument in support of possible prejudice is 
that the written specifications described that the chair's maximum height was 21.5 inches, 
while counsel for Shopko represented that its maximum height was 19 inches. 
20. This Court is not persuaded that this distinction is significant. In the first place, there was 
no indication that the chair was in fact extended to it's maximum height at the time of the 
incident. Therefore, the idea that the jury automatically concluded that Ms. Harris fell 
from a 19 inch position is without merit. We simply do not know the height of the chair 
at the time of her fall. Furthermore, Ms. Harris herself testified that the seat pad detached 
from the chair immediately, and did little, if anything, to break her fall. Accordingly, 
whether the chair was adjusted to 19 inches, 21.5 inches, or something else, has little 
significance. 
21. Finally, Harris asserts that counsel for Shopko offered improper testimony by 
representing to the jury that the maximum height of the chair was 19 inches, and that the 
specifications for the chair should have been allowed to impeach counsel's improper 
testimony. This argument was not made at trial, thus this Court was not able to consider 
allowing the specifications to come in for impeachment purposes. In asserting this point 
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now Harris concedes that Plaintiffs counsel refrained from objecting to the improper 
testimony by counsel during trial "as part of a litigation strategy." Plaintiffs 
Memorandum at 21. Where Plaintiffs counsel exercised professional discretion in not 
making an objection at trial, this Court will not now consider that as reversible error. 
22. Accordingly, the exclusion of the chair's specifications is not a basis for a new trial or 
additur. 
Present Cash Value 
23. Harris next objects to the instruction provided to the jury with regard to present cash 
value. The instruction, which was taken from the Model Jury Instructions, provided to 
the jury was as follows: 
If you decide that Wendy Harris is entitled to damages for future economic losses, 
then the amount of those damages must be reduced to present cash value. This is 
because any damages awarded would be paid now, even though Wendy Harris 
would not suffer the economic losses until some time in the future. Money 
received today would be invested and earn a return or yield. To reduce an award 
for future damages to present cash value, you must determine the amount of 
money needed today that, when reasonably and safely invested, will provide 
Wendy Harris with the amount of money needed to compensate her for future 
economic losses, if any. In making your determination, you should consider the 
earnings from a reasonably safe investment. 
24. Harris asserts that some manner of testimony was required for the jury to interpret how to 
calculate the damages into a present value. Harris cites as authority Gallegos ex rei 
Rynes v. Dick Simon Trucking, Inc., 2004 UT App 322, 110 P.3d 710, cert, denied (Utah 
2005). However the Gallegos decision does not stand for this proposition. Gallegos 
permits expert testimony on annuities in order to translate the present value of those 
future payments. However, as is observed by the Committee Notes, "Utah law is silent 
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on whether expert testimony, government tables, or other evidence is necessary before a 
jury is charged to calculate present cash value." MUJI CV2021 Committee Notes. 
25. Based on current law, no expert testimony or other supplementary evidence was required 
in this case for the jury to make the determination on present value. The plaintiffs 
evidence with regard to future damages was not presented in the form of a future sum, 
such as an annuity, which needed to be translated into a present value. Rather, plaintiff 
presented the present cost of medical procedures which would be required in the future. 
It was fairly within the province of the jury to make a reasonable judgment about the 
present sum of money Ms. Harris would require for her future treatments. 
26. Furthermore, the jury instruction given prevented confusion. Had no instruction been 
given, the jury would have been forced to guess at whether they were to award damages 
based on present value or on some unknown future figure. Instructing the jury with an 
accurate statement of the law provided them with the information they required to make a 
fair and reasonable award of damages. 
Apportionment of Pre-Existing Injury 
27. Harris asserts that the court erred in advising the jury on the issue of apportionment, and 
that this error warrants the granting of a new trial. 
28. Shopko presented substantial evidence that Harris's injuries could be attributed to 
alternative sources, both through cross examination of Plaintiff s witnesses, and through 
affirmative testimony from its own witnesses. Harris had a history of neck and back pain, 
her medical records included references to fibromyalgia, and testimony also included the 
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opinion that her current condition was not trauma-related, but caused by degenerative 
disk disease. In short, testimony was conflicted with regard to the cause of Harris's 
condition. 
29. The Utah Supreme Court considered the issue of apportionment in Robinson v. All-Star 
Delivery, 992 P.2d 969 (Utah 1999). In Robinson, the plaintiff sued the defendant after a 
motor vehicle collision where plaintiff alleged the he was physically injured. The 
defendant did not dispute his liability in causing the accident, but asserted that plaintiffs 
injuries were attributable to a previous motor vehicle accident. Id At trial, the parties 
presented conflicting expert testimony as to whether the plaintiffs injuries arose from the -
previous accident, or the accident at issue. The plaintiffs doctor testified that the 
physical injuries were primarily the result of the accident defendant caused, while 
defendant's doctor "concluded that it was more likely than not that [the plaintiffs 
injuries] each stemmed from the [previous] accident. However, [he] acknowledged that 
the [later] accident could have caused a 'flare up' or 'some increase' in pain to 
Robinson's preexisting injuries.'5 Id. at ^6. 
30. The trial court did not give plaintiffs proposed jury instruction on aggravation of 
preexisting injuries, and when the jury verdict returned for a lesser amount than was 
requested, the plaintiff appealed, The Utah Supreme Court found the trial conn's 
decision to be reversible error, and the case was remanded for a new trial on damages. In 
so holding, the Court observed that "the evidence was in conflict as to the 
apportionability of the damages. [The plaintiffs doctor] testified that the [recent] accident 
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caused most of Robinson's damages, [The defendant's doctor] testified that the [earlier] 
accident caused Robinson's injuries. Thus, the trial court should have instructed the jury-
on what to do if it was unable to apportion damages in a reasonable manner." Id at 14. 
31. The facts of the present case are notably similar to those of Robinson. In both instances, 
the plaintiffs medical testimony indicated that the injuries were linked to the accident 
which initiated the lawsuit, while the defendant's medical testimony indicated that the 
injuries were largely attributable to other causes. In neither Robinson nor this case was 
there an attempt to offer testimony as to what specific percentage, if any, of the damages 
could be tied to the accident at issue.1 Thus, the jury needed to be instructed about what 
to do if they could not apportion the damages in a reasonable manner. 
32. The instructions given in the present case accomplished that purpose. Taken entirely 
from Model Utah Jury Instruction, Civil 2018 and 2019, the instructions advised jurors 
that it is their duty to try to apportion damages, and if they were not able to reasonably do 
so, then they must conclude that the entire harm was caused by Shopko. This is a correct 
statement of the law, and it provided the jury with the information they required in order 
• to weigh the conflicting testimony presented with regard to Harris's medical injuries. 
Whereas the Robinson court determined, under strikingly similar circumstances, that it 
*It does not appear that this type of specificity is required, as the Committee Note makes 
clear that the jury need not make this precise finding in its verdict. The Committee observes that 
u[t]his instruction is not intended to suggest that the verdict form include a line-item allocation of 
what part of the harm can be apportioned to the pre-existing condition, and what part to the 
defendant's fault. That question is answered by the jury's award of damages[.]" MUJI CV2018 
Committee Notes. 
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was reversible error not to give the pre-existing condition instruction, this court cannot 
reasonably find that it was reversible error to give it. 
Liability of a Business Owners Jury Instruction 
33. Harris next contends that the Jury Instruction regarding the liability of business owners 
was error and should result in a new trial or additur, Harris does not assert that the 
instruction was an incorrect statement of the law; rather, she claims that the instruction 
was prejudicial and resulted in a lowered damage award, Shopko responds that this 
instruction was directed to address the jury's deliberations regarding liability, and 
whereas the jury found Shopko negligent, the instruction has no bearing on Harris's 
current complaint regarding the damage award. 
34. Shopko is correct that the jury instruction at issue is unrelated to damages. It solely 
addressed the question of negligence, and when read in its entirety, described for the jury 
the distinction between a temporary condition, which would require notice to the business 
owner, and a permanent condition, which would not. Harris does not specifically 
articulate how this instruction was prejudicial to its damage award, but broadly claims 
that the instruction suggests "that there is a requirement for a plaintiff to prove beyond 
negligence." Plaintiffs Memorandum at p. 26. 
35. This Court does not read any such requirement into this instruction. Whereas the jury 
found Shopko liable, this instruction has no relation to the damage award to which Harris 
now objects. Accordingly, it does not form a basis for a new trial or additur. 
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Dr. College's Delayed Recovery Syndrome Testimony 
36. Plaintiff asserts that the Court erred when it allowed Dr. College to testify regarding 
"delayed recovery syndrome" as this testimony was not relevant, and it was more 
prejudicial than probative. Harris maintains that this testimony acted to lower her award 
of damages. Shopko responds that this testimony was relevant because it speaks to the 
issue of whether the treatment Harris sought was necessary or reasonable, 
37. Dr. College offered his testimony regarding "delayed recovery syndrome" because it 
explained, in part, why he believed that the treatment she sought was not medicaly 
reasonable or necessary. Dr. College agreed that the Shopko incident had caused some 
soft tissue injury to the Plaintiff, but elaborated that this type of injury should be expected 
to heal after a matter of weeks, not years as was the case with Ms. Harris. In Ms. Harris's 
case, her condition evolved into what Dr. College described as "chronic pain." Dr. 
College explained that the remedies Harris had sought, such as chiropractic care, massage 
therapy, and surgery, were not reasonable or necessary for the treatment of her chronic 
pain. As stated by Dr. College: "after three to eight w?eeks the pain is chronic, establishes 
new circuitry, and serves no useful purpose. Hurt does not mean harm in this case, and 
to treat chronic pain like acute pain limits quality of life and is debilitating to the 
patients." Defendant's Opposition, at p. 32 (emphasis added). 
38. URE 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
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39. Given this broad definition of relevancy, it is simply not tenable to suggest that Dr. 
College's testimony on this point was not relevant. Central to the issue of damages in 
this case was the question of whether Ms. Harris's treatment was reasonable and 
necessary. Dr. College, one of Harris's treating physicians, used his assessment that she 
suffered from delayed recovery syndrome to explain why he believed much of the 
treatment she sought was neither reasonable nor necessary. It was Dr. College's opinion 
that Ms. Harris's course of treatment was not necessary to treat the injury she sustained in 
the Shopko incident. This type of testimony is relevant under the rule. 
40. Relevant evidence may be excluded if unduly prejudicial, as described in URE 403: 
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
41. Harris maintains that Dr. College's testimony is confusing and prejudicial She asserts 
that a tortfeasor takes the plaintiff as he finds her. This includes any physical or mental 
weakness that would make the plaintiff more susceptible to injury, or cause the plaintiff 
to heal more slowly. Accordingly, if Harris does suffer from delayed recovery syndrome, 
she is still entitled to recover for her injuries. 
42. However, the jury was instructed with regard to this principle. Jury Instruction No. 22 
reads as follows: "A person who may be more susceptible to injury than someone else is 
still entitled to recover the full amount of damages that were caused by Defendant's fault. 
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In other words, the amount of damages should not be reduced merely because Plaintiff 
may be more susceptible to injury than someone else." 
43. Accordingly, the jury was aware that any reduction in damages could not be given merely 
because Ms. Harris was susceptible to greater injury, or to a prolonged recovery as a 
result of her delayed recovery syndrome. 
44. In addition, much of Shopko's case was prejudicial to Harris, and similarly much of 
Harris's case was prejudicial to Shopko. Prejudice alone is not a sufficient basis to 
exclude relevant evidence. "[Tjhe critical question is whether certain testimony is so 
prejudicial that the jury will be unable to fairly weigh the evidence/' State v. Downs, 
2008 UT App 247 f7; 190 P.3d 17. 
45. This Court is not persuaded that Dr. College's testimony regarding delayed recovery 
syndrome prevented the jury from fairly weighing all of the evidence presented. His 
testimony was one factor among many which the jury considered in arriving at the 
damage award in this case. Indeed, it is clear from the verdict that the jury did not adopt 
Dr. College's pessimistic view of Harris's treatment. Dr. College discounted the nerve-
burning procedure Harris had received and testified that the future similar procedures she 
is seeking would not be helpful in treating her pain. Notwithstanding this, the jury 
awarded Harris $10,000 in future damages, adopting, at least in part, her theory that 
future medical treatment was reasonable and necessary and rejecting Dr. College's 
opinion that such a procedure was not reasonable in the treatment of her chronic pain. 
46. Accordingly, Dr. College's testimony does not provide a basis for new trial or an additur. 
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Dr. College's Curriculum Vitae 
47. Plaintiff further objects to the admission of Dr. College's Curriculum Vitae as 
documentary evidence, asserting that it is hearsay. 
48. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah 
R. Evid. 801(c). Unless an exception to this rule applies, hearsay is not admissible, See 
Utah R. Evid. 802. Harris asserts that receiving the CV was reversible error, as it allowed 
the jury to place undue emphasis on Dr. College's qualifications. 
49. Shopko concedes that the CV was hearsay, but claims that it qualifies for an exception to 
exclusion pursuant to Rule 807. However, at a minimum, this rule requires that the 
adverse party receive notice "in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to meet it." Utah R. Evid. 807. This notice was not given. 
50. Accordingly, the CV does not meet the hearsay exception outlined in Rule 807. 
Notwithstanding, this court is persuaded that "if a witness testifies to the points on his 
CV, exclusion serves little purpose" Defendant's Opposition at p. 35. Indeed, at trial, 
Dr. College's qualifications were fully presented to the jury and it seems far-fetched to 
believe that seeing in print the same information that was presented verbally amounts to 
the reversible error Harris now claims. 
51. The court must consider any motion for a new trial in light of the following: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
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inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding 
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 61. 
53. There is nothing presented by Harris to give rise to the conclusion that the jury's review 
of Dr. College's CV affected the substantial rights of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, it cannot 
be viewed as the basis for a new trial or additur, 
Dr. Rosenthal's Report 
54. Plaintiff next objects to the characterization at trial of her expert's report as ''attorney 
drafted." At trial, Shopko cross-examined Dr. Rosenthal regarding the credibility of the 
conclusions contained in his written report. This cross-examination included an inquiry 
into the fact that Dr. Rosenthal's report was drafted by Plaintiffs counsel, and then 
signed by Dr. Rosenthal after his review. Plaintiff objected, asserting that these questions 
were irrelevant and prejudicial, and Plaintiff renews this argument here. 
55. Procedural rules regarding expert reports permit the practice adopted by Plaintiff Parties 
are required to disclose expert witnesses prior to trial, and this disclosure must "be 
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or party"'1 Utah R. 
Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B)(emphasis added). Thus, Harris did nothing improper in proceeding in 
this fashion, and likely minimized some of the expenses of retaining an expert witness. 
Indeed, this cost-savings is contemplated by the rule.2 
2The Advisory Committee reports that one consideration for this rule was 4i[b]oth 
plaintiffs' attorneys and defense attorneys reported on the high cost of reports by experts[.]" Utah 
R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee's Note 
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56. However, the issue of cost-savings aside, the simple fact remains that the practice of 
having someone other than the witness draft the report may, under certain facts, introduce 
a credibility issue. This was the case here. Dr. Rosenthal's report contained in it's 
opening statement the assertion that the report was "based upon the review of the 
Plaintiffs medical records." However, Dr. Rosenthal conceded that his record review 
was incomplete, and that he had not reviewed Alta View Hospital's records, Spanish Fork 
Clinic's records. South Towne Chiropractic records, Central Utah Clinic's records, Dr. 
College's records, Utah Neurological Clinic's records, Dr. Cardner's report, 
Intermountain Healthcare records, Massage Envy records, Dr. Jackson's records, South 
Valley Physical Therapy records, the August 2007 MR], or the pre~Shopko incident 
records. What he had reviewed was a summary of these records, which had been 
prepared by Plaintiffs counsel. 
57. In short, Dr. Rosenthal's written assertion that, in consideration of his conclusions, he had 
reviewed the Plaintiffs medical records was, at best, an overstatement, which seems 
attributable to the fact that he did not author the report that he signed. Inquiry into the 
credibility of Dr. Rosenthal's report, and its conclusions, is allowed, and under these facts 
was clearly appropriate. 
58. Immediately prior to cross-examination on this issue, the court instructed the jury that 
"pursuant to Rule 26, a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert 
testimony in a case is required to submit a written report. That report may be prepared by 
either the witness who is testifying or a party." This supplemental*)' instruction was taken 
Memorandum Decision 
Page 18 of 24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
almost directly from the rule, and was intended to advise the jury that Harris had done 
nothing improper in allowing Dr. Rosenthal to sign a report prepared by counsel, and that 
no inference of impropriety should be given. Rather, any inquiry into the authorship of 
the report simply went to the weight of its conclusions. This is an issue which is clearly 
relevant for the jury to consider. Both parties at trial are entitled to fairness in the 
proceedings, and this includes the right of the Defendant to cross-examine an expert 
witness about the credibility of his conclusions. 
59. Accordingly, the court rejects the argument that die reference to Dr. Rosenthal's report as 
being "attorney-drafted" was irrelevant or unduly prejudicial 
Plaintiff s Loss of Consortium 
60. Harris's next claim of error is the exclusion of a portion of the testimony from Harris's 
husband, Tom Harris. At trial, Mr. Harris described for the jury the diminished quality of 
life Ms. Harris has experienced since the Shopko incident. Shopko objected at the point 
where Plaintiffs counsel inquired as to the couple's intimate relationship, based upon the 
fact that no loss of consortium claim had been made. The Court sustained Shopko's 
objection and excluded the testimony. Plaintiff now claims that non-economic damages 
were reduced as the jury was not permitted to hear this portion of Mr. Harris's testimony. 
61. However, at trial Ms. Harris offered her own testimony regarding her lessened quality of 
life since the incident, and was permitted to describe for the jury at length what she 
believes she has suffered in terms of non-economic damages. Mr. Harris was permitted 
to bolster her testimony, with the exception of his account of their intimate relationship. 
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62. Plaintiff does not dispute that there was no loss of consortium claim made on the part of 
Mr. Harris, and that the testimony proffered by Mr. Harris was intended only "to support 
the credibility of Ms. Harris's testimony[.]" Plaintiffs Memorandum at 34. 
63. Utah law provides that a spouse may maintain an action against a third party for loss of 
consortium, provided that such claim is made concurrently with the claim of the injured 
party. Utah Code Ann. §30-2-1 !(2)-(4). However, where this action included no 
complaint of loss of consortium, Mr. Harris's testimony about his lack of intimacy with 
his wife was simply not relevant. Mr. Harris's account of any lack of intimacy would 
have offered nothing to the jury's consideration of how Ms. Harris had been damaged. 
Ms. Harris was free to detail for the jury the manner in which the quality of her life had 
been diminished since her injury, and this testimony certainly could have included a 
description of her loss of intimacy. Had Shopko attacked her credibility on this point, 
Mr. Harris's testimony supporting her credibility would have been appropriate. However, 
Shopko maintains that it did not attack Ms. Harris's credibility regarding any loss of 
intimacy, and Harris, in not contesting this point, appears to concede the same. 
64. Accordingly, this Court is not persuaded that Mr. Harris's proffered testimony about his 
intimate relationship with his wife was relevant. Exclusion of this testimony is not a 
basis for a new trial or additur. 
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Sufficiency of the Evidence 
65. Harris next contends that a new trial or additur is warranted due to an insufficiency of the 
evidence, based upon the assertion that the damages awarded are inadequate given the 
evidence presented by the Plaintiff. 
66. Harris contends in support of this argument is that the damage award was given in a 
round number, and this should compel a finding that the jury simply reached an arbitrary 
figure without attempting to determine whether the damages were reasonable or 
necessary. No authority, however, is offered for this position, This Court declines to 
simply make this assumption. It is the prerogative of the jury to make the determination 
of damages, and deference must accordingly be given to the jury's verdict. "We cannot 
substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder unless the evidence compels a finding 
that reasonable men and women would, of necessity, come to a different conclusion/' 
Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, 787 P.2d 525, 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
67. The evidence presented at trial does not compel a different conclusion. Indeed, Harris's 
claim that the jury's damage award is not supported by the evidence ignores much of the 
testimony that was presented during this trial. While the Plaintiff did present significant 
evidence in its case that Ms. Harris was injured in the Shopko incident, and that she 
incurred necessary and reasonable medical expenses as a result, Shopko also presented a 
compelling case. Shopko's theory of the case was first, it was not negligent and did not 
cause Harris's injury, and second, if there was causation, that the medical expenses were 
unrealated to the Shopko incident, and they were not reasonable or necessary. 
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68. At the close of Harris's case-in-chief, both sides made a motion for a directed verdict. 
This Court denied both motions, noting that a reasonable jury could find for either the 
Plaintiff or the Defendant The verdict of the jury fully supports the Court's ruling on 
that motion. The jury in this matter concluded that Shopko was negligent and caused 
Ms. Harris's injury, thus rejecting Shopko's contention that it was not liable. However 
the jury also appears to have concluded that many of Shopko's arguments with regard to 
damages were well-taken. 
69. There were multiple grounds for the jury to reduce the amount of damages from what was 
requested by Harris. The jury heard significant evidence of the following: (1) Harris had 
pre-existing injuries and health complaints which could account for many of her on-going 
physical complaints, including evidence that Harris currently suffered from degenerative 
disc disease which was unrelated to the Shopko incident, and that she had previously 
complained of back pain and possible fibromyalgia; (2) Harris had abused pain 
medication after the Shopko incident, taking beyond the amount her physicians prescribed 
as necessary, thereafter placing herself in a position where she was physically dependant 
upon the drugs as well as actually intensifying her pain level; (3) much of her past 
treatment wras characterized as not being reasonable or necessary, as chiropractic sessions 
and message therapy did not serve to treat her underlying injury3; (4) the future treatment 
3The jury likely found in particular Ms. Harris's "couple's massage" to be a particularly 
egregious mis-use of treatment. While there was only one example of a couple's massage, this 
certainly could have undercut Harris's credibility and made it appear that she was seeking 
treatment that was not truly related to the Shopko incident. 
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requested was similarly criticized as being marginal, unnecessary, and completely 
speculative. 
70. In short, there was significant evidence to support the jury's conclusions that while 
Shopko was liable for Ms. Harris's fall, Shopko was not responsible for the amount of 
damages requested. While Harris may have a different opinion about the result, this is 
not a basis to set aside the damage award of the jury. 
71. Absent some evidence compelling this Court to set aside the conclusions of the jury, this 
Court declines to grant a new trial or additur on Harris's claim of insufficient evidence. 
Passion or Prejudice 
72. Plaintiffs final contention is that a new trial or additur is warranted as the jury's award 
appears to have been given under passion or prejudice. Rule 59 does permit a new trial or 
amendment to judgment for u[e]xcessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 59(a)(5). 
73. However, the Court of Appeals has previously determined that "[a] trial court cannot 
grant a new trial if there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict for either party and the 
judge merely disagrees with the judgment of the jury." Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724, 
729 (UT App 2002) (emphasis in original). 
74. As stated above, there is ample evidence to support the conclusions of the jury, and no 
evidence to suggest that the jury rendered its decision based upon passion or prejudice. 
Harris "simply failed to convince the jury of [her] entire case." Qnyeabor, 787 P.2d at 
530. This is not a basis for a new trial or additur. 
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ORDER 
75. Based upon all the foregoing, Harris's Motion for a New Trial or Additur is DENIED. 
DATED this P f t day of December, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Christine 5730hns0n 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE" 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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